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Note 
A New Look at Constitutional Errors  
in a Criminal Trial 
GAVIN R. TISDALE 
On appeal, an essential question in reviewing a constitutional error in a 
criminal trial is whether the error was a trial error or a structural error. The 
Supreme Court’s current framework for answering this question has led to 
widespread confusion and misapplication in both the courts and scholarship. In 
practice, that question—whether an error was trial error or structural error—can 
lead to antithetical results: stuctural error generally results in a new trial for the 
defendant without any showing of prejudice while trial error only requires the  
prosecution to prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Given the contrast between these two results, it is necessary that the framework 
under which courts evaluate constitional errors in a criminal trial uphold the 
purposes of appellate review.   
This Note begins with an overview of the current standards of review for 
constitional errors in a criminal trial and then details the history of structural 
error. Then this Note establishes a mode of analysis for evaluating the merits of 
the current framework, other scholars’ suggestions, and this Note’s proposal.  
Finally, this Note introduces a new framework for appellate review of constitional 
errors in a criminal trial by removing structural errors as a class and requiring 
all constitutional errors to undergo harmless-error review. The chasm in scholarly 
work on structural error, coupled with the implications of the Court’s current 
framework on the chances of a defendant’s success on appeal, call for a revived 
discussion about the merits of Court’s current framework.  This Note hopes to 
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A New Look at Constitutional Errors  
in a Criminal Trial 
GAVIN R. TISDALE* 
“[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant  
a fair trial, not a perfect one.”1 
                            —Justice Rehnquist 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During jury selection in a criminal case, a defense attorney moves for a 
peremptory strike of a juror. Over objection, the judge erroneously denies 
the attorney’s motion. The jury goes on to convict the defendant, and the 
defense attorney promptly files an appeal on the grounds of erroneous 
denial of a peremptory strike. On appeal, one of the first questions the 
court must ask is whether the error—erroneous denial of a peremptory 
strike of a juror—is a structural error or a trial error. The defense argues 
that it is a structural error, which requires a new trial without further 
analysis. The prosecution, on the other hand, will argue that it was a trial 
error, that it was harmless, and, thus, no new trial is necessary. How 
appellate courts determine that initial question—whether an error is a 
structural error or a trial error—is the focus of this Note. 
Twenty-five years ago, the United States Supreme Court attempted to 
clarify the framework for appellate review of constitutional errors 
occurring during criminal trials.2 In that decision, Arizona v. Fulminante, 
the Court established a bright-line rule for appellate courts to distinguish 
between two categories of constitutional errors: (1) structural errors and (2) 
trial errors.3 Unfortunately, a decision that was designed to bring 
consistency to the lower courts resulted in widespread misapplication in 
                                                                                                                          
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2017; Boston College, B.A. 2013. I 
would like to thank Professor Paul Bader and the members of the Connecticut Law Review for their 
guidance and thoughtful commentary. Tremendous gratitude is due to Natalia Peña for entertaining my 
senseless ramblings on this topic. Finally, I would like to dedicate this Note to my parents, Tom and 
Jeanie Tisdale, for inspiring me to pursue my passions.   
1 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). 
2 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306–10 (1991). 
3 Id. Structural errors are a small class of constitutional errors that occur in a criminal trial that 
require automatic reversal without any inquiry into their harmfulness. Id. at 309–10. Trial errors are all 
of the other constitutional errors that occur in a criminal trial, which do not require reversal if the state 
can prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 307–08. 
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the early years and an adverse effect on defendants’ rights over the long 
term.  
In the first few years after Fulminante, there were dozens of examples 
of appellate courts applying the Fulminante framework in an inconsistent 
manner and reaching contradictory conclusions.4 Even as courts have 
continued to sort out which errors fall into which category, the practical 
implications of the framework have forced judges to narrow the scope of 
constitutional protections in order to uphold factual guilt in the face of 
possible structural error.5 Even though the confusion and the erosion of the 
basic rationale are at the expense of a criminal defendant’s fundamental 
trial rights, only a handful of authors have suggested a framework to 
replace Fulminante. And those that have tend to focus on preserving the 
fundamental fairness of the criminal trial while consequently undermining 
the trial as a vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.   
This Note proposes a new framework for appellate review of 
constitutional error in criminal trials. In Part II, this Note outlines the 
current standards of appellate review of errors in a criminal trial. Parts III 
and IV then review two time periods: the era between the Court’s decision 
in Chapman and Fulminante (1967–1991), and the era since Fulminante 
(1991–present). Part V takes a step back to look at the “Thirty-Thousand 
Foot View” of the change in appellate review in order to show how the 
theoretical intent of Chapman and Fulminante has been compromised in 
practice.  
In Part VI, this Note establishes a common metric to analyze both the 
existing and proposed frameworks by focusing on the two primary 
principles of appellate review—accurate fact-finding and fundamental 
fairness. Secondary considerations—including judicial efficiency, finality, 
reducing gamesmanship, consistency, and flexibility—are also used to 
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of standards of appellate review. In 
Part VII, this Note then applies the mode of analysis to the current 
Fulminante framework as well as four scholarly proposals.  
This Note’s proposed framework would eliminate the distinction 
between structural error and trial error and, instead, analyze all properly 
preserved constitutional errors under harmless-error review. Courts would 
still review for plain error, but the defendant would bear the burden of 
persuasion if there had been a reasonable opportunity to object to the error 
during trial. Unlike other scholarly suggestions, this framework focuses 
primarily on the fact-finding principle of appellate review instead of the 
fundamental fairness principle. Overall, this framework would be more 
                                                                                                                          
4 See infra notes 100–05 and accompanying text (explaining how Professor McCord was able to 
cite dozens of cases that misapplied the Fulminante framework in different ways).  
5 See infra notes 204–10 and accompanying text (explaining how structural error has caused 
judges to narrow the constitutional protections warding against biased judges and conflicted counsel).  
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functional in practice, as it provides a clear, consistent framework for all 
errors but still has sufficient safeguards to protect the fundamental fairness 
of a criminal trial.   
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Under the “contemperanous objection rule,”6 an appellate court will 
review an error from the trial only if the defendant raised a timely 
objection during trial.7 If a party does not make a timely and specific 
objection to an error during trial, the error is “forfeited,”8 unless an 
objection could not be made during trial because of a change in the law9 or 
because the error concerned subject matter jurisdiction.10 
But even a forfeited error is reviewed for plain error. Under plain-error 
review, the defendant must show that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error 
was obvious, (3) the error affected the defendant’s “substantial rights,” and 
(4) the error “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation 
of judicial proceedings.”11 An appellate court is likely to find plain error 
when the error undermined a constitutional right of the defendant, but the 
court is unlikely to find plain error if the defendant or defense counsel 
contributed to the error, curative instructions were given, or if there was 
overwhelming evidence of guilt against the defendant.12 
If an error was properly preserved during trial, appellate courts apply 
harmless-error analysis, which states that a court will disregard “[a]ny 
error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial 
                                                                                                                          
6 Review Proceedings, 43 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PRO. 905, 933 (2014) [hereinafter Annual 
Review of Criminal Procedure].  
7 See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009) (explaining that only the plain-error 
standard of review is used for errors that are not objected to during trial). 
8 Id. When counsel fails to make a timely assertion of a right, he forfeits his client’s right to press 
the issue on appeal. Id. at 134–35. It should be noted that there is a difference between forfeiture and 
waiver, even though the terms are used interchangeably. The distinction is important because forfeiture 
allows for plain-error review while waiver usually does not. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 
(1993) (internal citations omitted). This distinction confuses scholars, attorneys, and judges—even 
Supreme Court Justices—alike. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 894 n.2 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“The Court [in Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion] uses the term ‘waive’ instead of 
‘forfeit.’ The two are really not the same, although our cases have so often used them interchangeably 
that it may be too late to introduce precision. . . .”). 
9 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 102 (1974) (explaining that a claim is not precluded 
under the contemporaneous objection rule because of a change in law between the trial and the appeal) 
(internal citations omitted).  
10 United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (explaining that a subject matter jurisdiction 
objection was preserved even though it was not raised on appeal).  
11 Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 (internal quotations omitted); see also FED. R. EVID. 103 (“A party may 
claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the 
party and . . .  a party on the record: (a) timely objects or moves to strike; and (b) states the specific 
ground, unless it was apparent from the context . . . .”).  
12 Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, supra note 6, at 948–53.  
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rights. . . .”13 The Supreme Court has designated different standards of 
harmlessness for constitutional errors and non-constitutional errors.14 A 
non-constitutional error is harmless if the court concludes that “the 
judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.”15 But if the error is a 
constitutional error, the court must then distinguish between structural 
error and trial error.16 A constitutional trial error requires a new trial only if 
the state17 can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not 
contribute to the verdict.18 Structural error, on the other hand, always 
requires a new trial.19 
There is some confusion about if and when structural errors can be 
forfeited, and the United States Supreme Court has sent mixed signals. In 
1986, the Court stated that Article III structural errors cannot be waived or 
forfeited.20 Seven years later, the Court refused to address whether 
structural errors could be forfeited because the case at hand could be 
decided on narrower grounds.21 In 1997, the Court confounded things 
again by stating, in dicta, that “the seriousness of the error claimed does 
not remove consideration of it from the ambit of the [plain-error 
review].”22 In 2010, the Court reserved the question of what effect 
structural error may have on the third prong of Olano, which presupposes 
that strucutral error is subject to forfeiture,23 though the answer is unclear. 
Further, it can be argued that removing an entire type of error from review 
under Rule 52(b) would conflict with the rule that the courts do not have 
                                                                                                                          
13 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). 
14 Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, supra note 6, at 958. 
15 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946).  
16 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308–10 (1991). Non-constitutional errors go through no 
such categorization. Parts III and IV, infra, go into great detail about how the courts have attempted to 
distinguish between structural error and trial error. 
17 The Supreme Court used the term the “beneficiary of a constitutional error,” Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), but the beneficiary is almost certainly the government in criminal 
cases because the constitutional protection attaches to the defendant. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI 
(“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . .”)  
18 Chapman, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).  
19 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308–10. 
20 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 US. 833, 850–51 (1986) (“To the extent 
that this structural principle is implicated in a given case, the parties cannot by consent cure the 
constitutional difficulty for the same reason that parties by consent cannot confer on federal courts 
subject-matter jurisdiction beyond the limitations imposed by [United States Constitution] Article III, § 
2. . . .”). 
21 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993) (stating that, “[t]here may be a special 
category of forfeited errors that can be corrected regardless of their effect on the outcome, but this issue 
need not be addressed”). It is possible to read these case together for the conclusion that like other 
errors such as subject matter jurisdiction, Article III errors can never be forfeited. 
22 Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 (1997).  
23
 See United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 263 (2010) (explaining that the Court has “noted the 
possibility that certain errors, termed “structural errors,” might “affect substantial rights” [from the 
plain-error analysis] regardless of their actual impact on an appellant’s trial”).  
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“the power to develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.”24 Nevertheless, scholars have mixed views 
as to whether the Court has definitively ruled on whether structural error 
can be forfeited.25 
Likewise, lower courts are in disagreement about the effect of 
forfeiture on structural error. Two judges on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently addressed this issue 
in depth in Al Bahlul v. United States.26 Judge Tatel argued in his 
concurring opinion that the United States Supreme Court’s comment in 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor27—that Article III 
structural claims cannot be waived or forfeited—is controlling.28 But Schor 
was decided before the Supreme Court defined structural error as a term of 
art in Fulminante.29 In Judge Henderson’s dissenting opinion, she argued 
that the United States Supreme Court had decided this issue in Johnson30 
and has actively noted that plain-error applies to “‘all’ forfeited arguments 
in a criminal case.”31 According to Judge Henderson, the First and Fifth 
Circuits concur with her reasoning.32 The United States Courts of Appeals 
for the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have also held that other 
                                                                                                                          
24 Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996).  
25Compare Michael H. Graham, Rule 103(a): Reversible, Harmless and Structural Error; an 
Overview, in 2 HANDBOOK OF FED. EVID. § 103:1 (7th ed.) (“A structural error requires automatic 
reversal regardless of whether or not the error can be shown to have affected a substantial right and 
regardless of whether the error was properly preserved below; structural errors are not subject to either 
harmless error or plain error analysis. . . .”) with David McCord, The “Trial”/”Structural” Error 
Dichotomy: Erroneous, and Not Harmless, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1401, 1406 (1997) (explaining 
structural-error and harmless-error analyses without reference to forfeiture) and generally Steven M. 
Shepard, Note, The Case Against Automatic Reversal of Structural Errors, 117 YALE L.J. 1180 (2008) 
(same).  
26 792 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  
27 478 U.S. 833, 850–51 (1986) (“To the extent that [a] structural principle is implicated in a 
given case, the parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional difficulty. . . .”).  
28Al Bahlul, 729 F.3d. at 23 (Tatel, J., concurring).  
29 Compare Schor, 478 US. at 833 (decided in 1986) with Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 
(1991). 
30 Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 (1997) (“[T]he seriousness of the error claimed 
does not remove consideration of it from the ambit of the [plain-error review].”); see supra note 22 and 
accompanying text. 
31 Al Bahlul, 792 F.3d at 30 (“Such a breach is undoubtedly a violation of the defendant’s rights, 
but the defendant has the opportunity to seek vindication of those rights in district court; if he fails to 
do so, rule 52(b) as clearly sets forth the consequences for that forfeiture as it does for all others.” 
(internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 136 (2009)).  
32 See id. (referring to United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 331 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e are 
bound by the Supreme Court’s plain-error cases, which we do not read as allowing for any exceptions 
to the application of the plain-error test for forfeited claims.”) and United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 
211, 220 (1st Cir. 2005) (explaining that the Court in Johnson held that “forfeited errors, even if 
structural, are subject to the imperatives of Rule 52(b)”). 
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structural errors are subject to forfeiture.33 But the United States Courts of 
Appeals for the Third and Sixth Circuits have held that structural errors 
cannot be forfeited,34 while the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit has reserved judgment on the issue.35 Al Bahlul, the circuit 
cases cited in Judge Henderson’s dissenting opinion, and the cases from 
the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits can be read together for the 
proposition that Article III strucutral claims cannot be forfeited while other 
strucutral errors still can be forfeited, but the extent of forfeiture on 
structural error remains uncertain, especially in light of the decisions in the 
Third and Sixth Circuits.  
The focus of this Note is how the courts should evaluate properly 
preserved constitutional error. Currently, courts must define a properly 
preserved constitutional error as either a structural or trial error.36 This 
Note proposes a new solution to that dichotomy. As such, this Note will 
evaluate only federal criminal cases and is limited to constitutional errors. 
Issues regarding plain error and non-constitutional error are addressed only 
inasmuch as they affect the structural error framework.  
III. CHAPMAN TO FULMINANTE 
Prior to 1967, all properly preserved constitutional errors were grounds 
for automatic reversal.37 But in Chapman v. California, the United States 
Supreme Court announced that “before a federal constitutional error can be 
held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was 
                                                                                                                          
33 See United States v. Yamashiro, 788 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2015) (applying plain-error 
review to the denial of counsel during the allocution phase of the defendants proceeding, a structural 
error, but finding that structural error automatically satisfies the third prong of the Olano plain-error 
test); United States v. Turrietta, 696 F.3d 972, 976 n.9 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[The Defendant’s] claim of 
‘strucutral’ error has little bearing on the application of the plain error test. Rule 52(b) does not permit 
exceptions based on the gravity of the asserted error.”); United States v. Folks, 236 F.3d 384, 390 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (explaining that failing to object to an improper amendment to an indictment, though a 
structural error, is subject to plain-error review). 
34
 See Railey v. Webb, 540 F.3d 393, 399 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is beyond dispute that judicial bias 
is structural error, not susceptible to forfeiture (or harmless error analysis).”); United States v. Adams, 
252 F.3d 276, 285–86 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A] fair reading of Olano dictates that when a defendant fails to 
object to a[n] [error], his claim on appeal is reviewed for plain error. . . unless he can show. . . that the 
error belongs in a special category of errors that should be corrected regardless of prejudice (i.e. the 
category of structural errors).”).  
35
 See United States v. Cain, 671 F.3d 271, 292 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that “[w]e need not 
resolve whether a structural error may be forfeited, a question that remains open in this Circuit and in 
the Supreme Court. . . .”) (referencing Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009)). This decision, of 
course, runs counter to the idea that the Supreme Court resolved the issue, albeit in dicta, in Marcus. 
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  
36 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (explaining how Fulminante created a bright-line rule 
for properly preserved constitutional error).  
37 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 20 (1967). 
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harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,”38 but the state generally bears the 
burden of persuasion.39 In that case, the Court found that the state failed to 
meet its burden to show that the error—comments by the judge and 
prosecutor referring to the defendant’s decision not to testify as evidence 
of guilt—did not contribute to the defendant’s conviction,40 and the case 
was subsequently reversed and remanded for a new trial “free from the 
pressure of unconstitutional inferences.”41 
Chapman is fundamental to understanding appellate review for two 
reasons. First, it extended the harmless-error test to constitutional errors, 
which meant that even constitutional errors could be harmless.42 Second, in 
a footnote, the Court identified three examples of constitutional error that 
could never be harmless:43 admitting into evidence a coerced confession in 
violation of the defendant’s Due Process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment,44 the denial of the right to the assistance of legal counsel in 
violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right,45 and a partial judge 
overseeing a trial in violation of the defendant’s Due Process rights under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.46 With these three examples, courts began 
finding other errors that required automatic reversal.47   
 
A.  Post-Chapman Automatic Reversal 
 
Several authors and sources have attempted to identify those 
constitutional errors that the Supreme Court has held or identified as 
                                                                                                                          
38 Id. at 24.   
39 Id. (citing 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21 (3d ed. 1940)). The Court stated that it is “the burden of 
the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his 
erroneously obtained judgment.” Id. Because the constitutional protections primarily attach to the 
defendant, the state is almost always the beneficiary of the error. See supra note 17. 
40 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 20.   
41 Id. at 26.  
42 Id. at 24. 
43 Id. at 23 n.8 (internal citations omitted). 
44 See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958) (“It seems obvious from the totality of this 
course of conduct, and particularly the culminating threat of mob violence, that the confession was 
coerced and did not constitute an ‘expression of free choice,’ that its use before the jury, over the 
petitioner’s objection, deprived him of ‘that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of 
justice,’ and, hence, denied him due process of law, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
45 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (“[A] provision in the Bill of Rights which is 
‘fundamental and essential to a fair trial’ is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
46 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (“[I]t certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment 
and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or property to 
the judgment of a court, the judge of which has direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in 
reaching a conclusion against him in his case.”). 
47 Courts and scholars fluctuate between using the terms “automatically reversible” and “per se 
reversible.” For the sake of consistency, this Note will use “automatically reversible.”  
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automatically reversible in the years between Chapman and Fulminante.48 
Even with several decades of hindsight, the sources differ on whether the 
United States Supreme Court established an automatically reversible error 
rule in different cases.49 The examples of automatically reversible error are 
listed below and then compared to the Supreme Court’s take of 
automatically reversible errors in order to show the discrepancies.    
1. McCord’s Five 
In his 1992 article on the evolution of automatic reversal, Professor 
McCord argued that there are only five types of automatically reversible 
error in addition to the three errors listed in Chapman.50 The five errors are 
(1) the “abridgement of the right to self representation,”51 (2) the 
“abridgement of the right to a public trial,”52 (3) the “unlawful exclusion of 
members of the defendant’s race from a grand jury,”53 (4) the “failure to 
assure an impartial jury in a capital case,”54 and (5) the “appointment of an 
interested party’s attorney as prosecutor for contempt charges.”55  
2. The Ninth Circuit’s 
A federal appellate practice guide for the Ninth Circuit recognizes 
McCord’s five and adds three:56 (1) the “denial of the right to effective 
assistance of counsel as the result of multiple representation in which an 
                                                                                                                          
48 See, e.g., McCord, supra note 25, at 1406 (listing “automatically reversible” errors in that time 
period, which are now referred to as strucutral errors); Bennett Evan Cooper, FEDERAL APPELLATE 
PRACTICE: NINTH CIRCUIT § 18:12 (2015-2016 Edition) (same); Lisa Griffin, 1 FEDERAL CRIMINAL 
APPEALS § 4:71 (2015) (same). 
49 The clearest way to show the discrepancy is by total number of identified automatically 
reversible errors. Some authors cite different cases for variations of the same error, but the listing 
below has limited any overlap between errors.  
50 McCord, supra note 25, at 1406.   
51 Id. (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) (explaining in a footnote that 
since the right of self-representation (i.e. the defendant proceeding pro se) usually increases the 
likelihood of an unfavorable outcome for the defendant, the denial of the right is not amenable to 
harmless-error review)).  
52 Id. (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49–50 n.9 (1984) (explaining that the Court granted 
a new suppression hearing, which was previously done behind closed doors in violation of the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, only because it agreed with the lower courts that 
the defendant should not be required to prove prejudice and that harmless-error was inappropriate)). 
53 Id. (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263–64 (1986) (explaining that discrimination by a 
grand jury “undermines the structural integrity of the criminal tribunal itself, and is not amenable to 
harmless-error review”)).  
54 Id. (citing Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987) (explaining that because the erroneous 
exclusion of a juror in a capital case “goes to the very integrity of the legal system, the Chapman 
harmless-error analysis cannot apply”)).  
55 Id. (citing Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 809–14 (1969) (explaining that the 
appointment of an interested prosecutor undermines the objectivity of the trial and the public trust in 
the judicial system, and is therefore not amenable to harmless-error review)).  
56 Cooper, supra note 48. It should be noted that the guide does not claim to create an exhaustive 
list. 
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actual conflict of interest affects the adequacy of representation,”57 (2) the 
unlawful exclusion of the defendant’s gender from the jury,58 and (3) the 
failure to have all critical stages of a criminal trial presided over by judge 
with jurisdiction.59  
3.  The Federal Criminal Appeals Guide’s 
A Federal Criminal Appeals guide adds another error that constitutes 
automatic reversal: a violation of the bar on double jeopardy.60 
4.  The United States Supreme Court’s  
In a 2006 decision, the Supreme Court listed what appear to be all of 
the errors that it has classified as automatically reversible errors.61 The 
Court explained: “Only in rare cases has this Court held that an error . . . 
requires automatic reversal.”62 In a footnote, the Court listed five errors 
that were defined before Fulminante: (1) the total deprivation of the right 
to counsel, (2) the lack of an impartial trial judge, (3) the unlawful 
exclusion of grand jurors of the defendant’s race, (4) the deprivation of the 
right to self-representation at trial, and (5) the deprivation of the right to a 
public trial.63 Although the Court does not explicitly state that this is an 
exhaustive list, by listing cases that are both relevant and irrelevant to the 
error at hand, the Court implies that the list contains all of the structural 
errors that the Court has classified up to that point. This would allude to 
the exclusion of errors that other authors purport to be additions to the 
limited class of structural errors, like the “appointment of an interested 
party’s attorney as prosecutor for contempt charges,”64 the “denial of the 
                                                                                                                          
57 Id. (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349 (1980) (explaining that once a defendant is 
represented by an attorney with an actual conflict of interest, it is never harmless-error)). Other research 
revealed the Court decided that issue two years early in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489–91 
(1978).  
58 Id. (citing Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 257 (1988) (explaining that the 
exclusion of the defendant’s gender is similar to the exclusion of the defendant’s race and therefore 
unamenable to harmless-error analysis)).  
59 Id. (citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876 (1989) (explaining that the right to have 
all critical stages of a criminal trial conducted by a judge with jurisdiction to preside is a trial right like 
the right to an impartial adjudicator which is unamenable to harmless-error analysis)) (additional 
citations omitted). 
60 Griffin, supra note 48 (citing Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331 (1970) (explaining that a 
violation of the bar on double jeopardy is unamenable to harmless-error analysis)). 
61 Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218 n.2 (2006). Because this decision was written after 
Fulminante, the Court uses the term “structural error.” However, most of the decisions it cites were 
decided before the Court changed the term of art from “per se reversible error” or “automatically 
reversible error” to “structural error” in Fulminante.  
62 Id. at 218. 
63 Id. at 218 n.2.  
64 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (explaining that the appointment of an interested 
prosecutor undermines the objectivity of the trial and the public trust in the judicial system, and is 
therefore not amenable to harmless-error review). 
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right to effective assistance of counsel as the result of multiple 
representation in which an actual conflict of interest affects the adequacy 
of representation,”65 the unlawful exclusion of the defendant’s gender from 
the jury,66 the failure to have all critical stages of a criminal trial presided 
over by a judge with jurisdiction,67 and a violation of the bar on double 
jeopardy.68 
There are a few possible explanations for the discrepancies between 
authors and the Court: either the authors misinterpreted the Court’s 
holdings in some of the cases as classifying a new automatically reversible 
error, the Court did not intend this list to be exhaustive, or the Court did 
not adequately review its previous holdings. Regardless, the discrepancy 
between sources is indicative of the ensuing confusion after Chapman. If 
scholars and the Court are at odds over what classifies as automatically 
reversible, lower courts and attorneys are likely to be as well, which puts 
the consistency of a defendant’s appeal at stake.   
IV. FULMINANTE 
In 1991, the Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Fulminante, a case 
that, on its facts, mirrored an error that the Court had already decided was 
automatically reversible.69 In a splintered opinion, a majority of justices 
held that the admission of the defendant’s coerced confession was 
amenable to harmless-error analysis, but that the prosecution had not 
proven harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt and a new trial was 
ordered.70 Fulminante might not be noteworthy in appellate review except 
that a majority of justices joined the part of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
dissenting opinion that created a new framework for evaluating 
constitutional errors.   
                                                                                                                          
65 See supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining that once a defendant is represented by 
an attorney with an actual conflict of interest, it is never harmless-error). 
66 See supra note 58 and accompanying text (explaining that the exclusion of the defendant’s 
gender is similar to the exclusion of the defendant’s race and therefore unamenable to harmless-error 
analysis).  
67 See supra note 59 and accompanying text (explaining that the right to have all critical stages of 
a criminal trial conducted by a judge with jurisdiction to preside is a trial right like the right to an 
impartial adjudicator which is unamenable to harmless-error analysis). 
68 See supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining that a violation of the bar on double 
jeopardy is unamenable to harmless-error analysis). 
69 Compare Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 283–84 (1991) (explaining that the trial court 
admitted a statement from the defendant that was coerced by a government informant in exchange for 
protection against other prisoners) with Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958) (explaining that 
the trial court admitted a statement from the defendant that was coerced by a police officer because of a 
threat of a dangerous mob).   
70 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 302.   
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Section II of the Chief Justice’s opinion establishes a bright-line rule. 
The Section began with a string-cite of sixteen cases,71 all of which were 
examples of constitutional errors that were amenable to harmless-error 
analysis (i.e. errors that were not classified as automatically reversible). 
The Chief Justice then explained that, “[t]he common thread connecting 
these cases is that each involved ‘trial error[,]’”72 which the Court 
subsequently defined as “error which occurred during the presentation of 
the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in 
the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its 
admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”73 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist went on to address footnote eight in Chapman,74 which would 
seem to require automatic reversal for this type of error.75  But according to 
                                                                                                                          
71 See, e.g., id. at 306–07 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part) (“Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 
738, 752–754 (1990) (applying harmless-error review to unconstitutionally overbroad jury instructions 
at the sentencing stage of a capital case); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988) (applying 
harmless-error review to the admission of evidence at the sentencing stage of a capital case in violation 
of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266 (1989) (applying 
harmless-error review to a jury instruction containing an erroneous conclusive presumption); Pope v. 
Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501–504 (1987) (applying harmless-error review to a jury instruction misstating 
an element of the offense); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) (applying harmless-error review to jury 
instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 
(1986) (applying harmless-error review to an erroneous exclusion of defendant's testimony regarding 
the circumstances of his confession); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (applying 
harmless-error review to a restriction on a defendant's right to cross-examine a witness for bias in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117–118, 
and n. 2 (1983) (applying harmless-error review to the denial of a defendant's right to be present at 
trial); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (applying harmless-error review to an improper 
comment on defendant's silence at trial, in violation of the Fifth Amendment Self–Incrimination 
Clause); Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982) (applying harmless-error review to a statute improperly 
forbidding trial court's giving a jury instruction on a lesser included offense in a capital case in 
violation of the Due Process Clause); Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979) (applying harmless-
error review to the failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence); Moore v. Illinois, 434 
U.S. 220, 232 (1977) (applying harmless-error review to admission of identification evidence in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231–232 
(1973) (applying harmless-error review to the admission of the out-of-court statement of a 
nontestifying codefendant in violation of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause); Milton v. 
Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972) (applying harmless-error review to a confession obtained in violation 
of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52–53 (1970) 
(applying harmless-error review to the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1970) (applying harmless-error review to the 
denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing in violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Clause).”). 
72 Id at 307.  
73 Id. at 307–08.  
74 Footnote eight in Chapman listed examples of errors that could never be found harmless. See 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967) (“See, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) 
(coerced confession); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 
273 U.S. 510 (1927) (impartial judge).” (internal citations edited)). 
75 Fulminante, 499 U.S at 310.  
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the Chief Justice, the admittance into evidence of a coerced confession76 
was different than both the denial of the right to the assistance of legal 
counsel77 and a partial judge overseeing a trial78 because the former case 
dealt with a trial error, while the other two cases dealt with “structural 
defects . . . , which defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards.”79  
Therefore, the case before the Court was still susceptible to harmless-error 
analysis because it did not “affect[] the framework within which the trial 
proceeds . . . .”80 
What lawyers, courts, and scholars have concluded from this structural 
error and trial error dichotomy is a bright-line rule with three factors. To 
find structural error, a court must find that the error: (1) did not occur 
during the presentation of the case to the jury,81  (2) cannot be 
quantitatively assessed on appeal,82 or (3) affects the framework in which 
the trial proceeds.83  
In deciding to create this dichotomy, the Court emphasized the need 
for harmless-error review of trial errors by stating that it is  
[E]ssential to preserve the ‘principle that the central purpose 
of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the 
defendant's guilt or innocence, and promotes public respect 
for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying 
fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable 
presence of immaterial error.84   
As for the justification of creating structural error, the Court explained that 
“‘[w]ithout these basic [structural] protections, a criminal trial cannot 
reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or 
innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally 
fair.’”85  
A.  Post-Fulminante Structural Error 
Similar to the post-Chapman era, courts, lawyers, and scholars have 
struggled to categorize errors as either structural errors or trial errors. As 
Professor McCord explained in his article, published just five years after 
                                                                                                                          
76 Payne, 356 U.S. at 567.  
77 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342. 
78 Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523. 
79 Fulminante, 499 U.S at 309.  
80 Id. at 310.  
81 Id. at 307 (explaining that one of the factors is whether the error occurred “during the 
presentation of the case to the jury”).  
82 Id. at 308 (explaining that one of the factors is whether the error can be “quantitatively 
assessed” on appeal).  
83 Id. at 310 (explaining that one of the factors is whether the error “affect[s] the framework 
within which the trial proceeds”). 
84 Id. at 308 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)). 
85 Id. (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577–78 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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Fulminante, the troublesome applications of the structural error and trial 
error dichotomy outnumbered the easy applications in just the first few 
years.86 Because of how Fulminante was written, lower courts either 
analogized new types of error with the three-factor test or compared them 
to either the string-cite of the sixteen trial errors or previously determined 
automatically reversible errors.87  
Professor McCord identified five categories of errors with which 
courts struggled: (1) jury instruction errors,88 (2) errors during trial that did 
not involve the admission or exclusion of evidence,89 (3) errors that neither 
occurred during the trial nor had a bearing on the inclusion or exclusion of 
evidence,90 (4) errors that were arguably, but not clearly, in a previously 
established structural category,91 and (5) errors that fit clearly within the 
evidentiary definition of trial error but brought serious constitutional 
implications.92 Although these categories establish what issues were being 
presented to lower courts, the two overarching struggles for courts were 
trying (1) to dichotomize errors when, in reality, errors fall on a spectrum 
and (2) to justify cases that may be either structural but would really have 
no impact on the outcome of the case or cases that may contain trial errors 
that would have major impacts on the fairness of the trial.   
The right to a public trial is a perfect example. In People v. 
Woodward,93 the Supreme Court of California held that the trial court was 
properly closed to the public,94 but the judge failed to notify the defendant 
of the closure.95 The Court held that this type of error did not amount to a 
structural error according to the three Fulminante definitions, and was 
therefore amenable to harmless-error review.96 Another court, in People v. 
Harris,97 held that holding preemptory challenges in the judge’s chambers 
was a structural error requiring reversal, regardless of the impact on the 
verdict.98 Even though the Supreme Court held that the denial of the right 
                                                                                                                          
86 McCord, supra note 25, at 1418.   
87 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306–10.  
88 McCord, supra note 25, at 1418.  
89 Id. at 1419.  
90 Id. at 1420–21.  
91 Id. at 1421.  
92 Id. at 1422.  
93 841 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1992). 
94 The Supreme Court of California explained that posting a “Do Not Enter” sign that stopped 
people from entering who were not seated before closing arguments began, while allowing those 
already seated to remain, was not enough to violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.  Id. at 955. 
95 Id. It is important to note that while the Court held that the closure did not violate the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right, the Court still used the constitutional harmless-error analysis 
described in Chapman to evaluate the defendant’s lack of notice of the closure.  Id. at 960. 
96 Id. 
97 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 758 (Ct. App. 1992). 
98 Id. at 766–68.  
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to a public trial was a structural error,99 courts struggled to understand 
exactly how far the reach of that classification could go.  
This period is rife with courts applying mismatching rationales to find 
structural error and trial error. For example, Professor McCord cited four 
cases that dealt with misdescriptions of the courts’ final criminal charges 
against the defendant.100 One court held that that this type of error was a 
trial error because it had been found harmless in an older case;101 another 
found it to be structural because it “undermines the basic function of the 
jury;”102 a third found it to be trial error by foregoing the three-factor test 
and analogizing it to three of the cases from Fulminante’s string cite;103 
and a fourth court concluded that the list of structural errors in Fulminante 
was exhaustive and therefore, must have been trial error.104 The confusion 
among the lower courts was so pervasive that only five years after 
Fulminante, Professor McCord was able to list dozens of cases that either 
used the three Fulminante factors, used just the factor regarding the 
quantitative assessment of the error, simply analogized to other cases 
without looking at Fulminante, or ignored the Fulminante analysis 
altogether.105 
The Supreme Court further mystified the appropriate analysis in some 
of its commentary in Brecht v. Abrahamson.106 There, the Court referred to 
the possibilities of constitutional error as falling on a spectrum,107 which 
undermines the bright-line rule announced in Fulminante. 
Possibly in an effort to clarify the analytical disarray, the Court may 
have also added a fourth factor for structural error in 1999, with its opinion 
in Neder v. United States.108 In that case, the Court evaluated another error 
in jury instructions109 and held this error was subject to harmless-error 
review.110 In doing so, the Court stated that unlike deprivation of counsel 
or a biased judge, “an instruction that omits an element of the offense does 
not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable 
vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.”111 The same language was 
                                                                                                                          
99 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984). 
100 McCord, supra note 25, at 1418 n.123 and accompanying text.  
101 Id. (referring to Schrier v. Iowa, 941 F.2d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1991)).  
102 Id. at 1419 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 618 A.2d 1372, 1377–78 n.5 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993)).  
103 Id. (citing White v. United States, 613 A.2d 869, 875–79 (D.C. 1992) (en banc)). 
104 Id. (citing State v. Hall, 606 So. 2d 972, 980 (La. Ct. App. 1992)).  
105 See id. at 1436–40 (listing cases that fell within several “troublesome applications” and the 
type of approach that each court took).    
106 507 U.S. 619 (1993).  
107 Id. at 629.  
108 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999).  
109 The error in the jury instructions was that the instructions omitted an element of the offense. 
Id. at 8.  
110 Id. at 9. 
111 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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used more recently in Washington v. Recuenco,112 decided in 2006, which 
held that Blakely error113 was not a structural error.114 
Among all of the confusion, the Court has been reluctant to add certain 
classes of structural error. In fact, the Court has gone so far as to say that 
there is a “strong presumption” against structural error “[i]f the defendant 
had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator . . . .”115 In the 
twenty-five years after Fulminante there have been only two cases from 
the United States Supreme Court that defined new structural errors.   
In the first, Sullivan v. Louisiana,116 the Court held that constitutionally 
deficient reasonable doubt instructions were a structural error requiring 
reversal because they denied the defendant the right to a trial by jury.117 In 
the majority opinion, Justice Scalia first explained that the deficient 
instructions denied the defendant the right to a jury trial because, on 
appeal, the court usurped the role of the jury in finding guilt.118 Only after 
explaining the need for reversal on those grounds did Justice Scalia use the 
Fulminante analysis.119 In evaluating the error before the Court, Justice 
Scalia summarily reasoned that “[t]he deprivation of that right, with 
consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, 
unquestionably qualifies as ‘structural error.’”120 
In the second, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,121 the Court held that 
erroneous deprivation of the right to a defendant’s choice of counsel, not to 
be confused with the right to effective assistance of counsel, was a 
structural error.122 Justice Scalia cited two of the factors from Fulminante, 
explaining that this type of error is unquantifiable and indeterminate and 
that it directly affects the framework in which the trial occurs.123  
The circuit courts have defined other additional errors as structural. 
Most circuits have labeled improper amendment of an indictment as a 
                                                                                                                          
112 548 U.S. 212 (2006). 
113 Blakely error occurs during the sentencing of a defendant when the presiding judge uses a fact, 
other than a prior conviction, that has neither been admitted by the defendant nor proven to the jury in 
order to impose a sentence beyond the statutory maximum. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304–
05 (2004).  
114 Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 222.  
115 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 
(1986)).  
116 508 U.S. 275 (1993).  
117 Id. at 279 (“[T]o hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered—no matter how 
inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be—would violate the jury-trial guarantee.”). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 281 (“Another mode of analysis (Fulminante) leads to the same conclusion . . . .”). 
120 Id. at 281–82.  
121 548 U.S. 140 (2006). 
122 Id. at 150 (“We have little trouble concluding that erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel 
of choice . . . qualifies as a ‘structural error.’”). 
123 Id.   
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structural error.124 And the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
have each held that the accumulation of errors—even if each error in 
isolation is a trial error—can be a structural error requiring reversal.125 
In the last twenty-five years, the bright-line rule in Fulminante has 
casted doubt and created confusion within the criminal appellate process. 
The circuit courts remain split on some issues,126 and more alarming, the 
actual analytical framework between courts varies greatly. Confusion 
aside, as will be explained in Part VII, the rationale upon which the 
distinction was originally created has been undermined in practice. And 
since the classification of structural error or trial error acts as a gatekeeper 
between harmless-error analysis and automatic reversal, the chances of a 
successful appeal depend greatly on this initial question. In order to protect 
the rights of defendants and promote the integrity of the fact-finding 
process, at the very least the framework in which errors are appealed 
should be consistent, predictable, and uphold the purposes of a criminal 
trial. 
V. CONNECTING THE DOTS  
As mentioned before, the detailed view of automatically reversible 
error and structural error is necessary to establish how the Court’s rationale 
has evolved over time, but at this point a broader view is necessary to show 
how the rationale in these cases connect and why the application has been 
difficult.    
From a bird’s eye view, the jurisprudence on automatically reversible 
error in the post-Chapman era can be described most aptly as a game of 
“telephone.” After all, it was only in footnote eight that the Court stated 
that there were three errors that could never be found harmless under 
harmless-error review.127 The Court did not state that harmless error could 
never be applied to these errors; it simply stated that in its view, if such 
                                                                                                                          
124 See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 558 F.3d 495, 502–03 (6th Cir. 2009); United States  v. 
McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 229–32 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Hoover, 467 F.3d 496, 502 (5th Cir. 
2006); United States v. Milstein, 401 F.3d 53, 65–66 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Narog, 372 F.3d 
1243, 1249–50 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Collins, 350 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Folks, 236 F.3d 384, 390 (7th Cir. 2001); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 
2000); United States v. Fletcher, 74 F.3d 49, 53 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lawton, 995 F.2d 290, 
292 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Additionally, the Annotated Review of Criminal Procedure from Georgetown 
University Law Center gives an updated list of the circuit decisions for structural error. Annual Review 
of Criminal Procedure, supra note 6, at 948–53. 
125 See, e.g., United States v. Alferahin, 433 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Yakobowicz, 427 F.3d 144, 154 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Monger, 185 F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir. 
1999); Woods v. Dugger, 923 F.2d 1454, 1460 (11th Cir. 1991). 
126 See supra notes 26–35 and accompanying text (explaining the discrepancy among circuits 
regarding forfeiture of structural error); supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text (explaining 
different structural errors among the circuits). 
127 Chapman, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967).  
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errors occurred, the prosecution could never carry its burden of 
persuasion.128 The first two cases that classified errors as automatically 
reversible errors were also mentioned only in footnotes.129   
Waller, which classified the abridgement of the right to a public trial as 
an automatically reversible error, is particularly curious. In that case, there 
is no mention of Chapman, and the only mention of harmless error is in a 
string cite of cases that explain how difficult it is to show prejudice from a 
violation of the right to a public trial.130 The Court’s rationale was based on 
the presumption that the defendant would never be able to prove the 
prejudice from the court’s closure, but a new suppression hearing was 
nonetheless necessary to uphold that right.131 However, if the Chapman 
standard was correctly applied, it would have been the prosecution, not the 
defendant, who would have the burden to persuade the Court that the error 
did not affect the verdict. Yet, scholars and courts alike have cast the 
decision in the pot with the other automatically reversible errors.   
Three of the subsequent cases were similarly cast into the pot due to an 
inferential comparison with one of the original three errors listed in 
Chapman. These errors—an attorney representing multiple defendants with 
conflicting interests,132 the unlawful exclusion of members of the 
defendant’s race from a grand jury,133 and the failure to assure an impartial 
jury in a capital case134—were compared to the impermissibility of a partial 
judge from Tumey135 in footnote eight of Chapman.136 Another link in the 
game of telephone was added when the appointment of an interested 
party’s attorney as prosecutor for contempt charges,137 was compared to an 
attorney representing multiple defendants with conflicting interests138 and 
the unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant’s race from a grand 
jury.139 The failure to have all critical stages of a criminal trial, including 
                                                                                                                          
128 Id. at 23. 
129 See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) (regarding the abridgement of the 
right to self representation); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984) (reviewing the standard 
applicable to the abridgement of the public-trial right).  
130 Waller, 467 at 49 n.9.  
131 Id. at 50. 
132 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489 (1978) (comparing a partial adjudicator to a 
conflicted attorney). Holloway actually used both Tumey and Gideon as its founding comparisons for 
automatic reversal. Id. 
133 See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263–64 (1986) (explaining that automatic reversal is 
required because, like a biased judge, “we must presume the process was impaired”).  
134 See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987) (“The right to an impartial adjudicator, be it 
judge or jury, is such a right [that requires automatic reversal].”). 
135 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). 
136 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967). 
137 Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 813 (1987).  
138 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490–91 (1978).  
139 Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263–64 (1986) 
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jury selection, presided over by someone with jurisdiction was similarly 
compared to a partial jury in a capital case.140 
Of course, effective appellate advocacy requires comparison to 
established precedents that are both on point and well reasoned. American 
jurisprudence is also expanded into new territories through analogy. But 
what started as a mere reference in a footnote resulted in whole areas of 
errors being classified as automatically reversible. For instance, the failure 
to have all critical stages of a criminal trial, including jury selection, 
presided over by someone with jurisdiction, was compared to the failure to 
ensure an impartial jury in a capital case, which had, in turn, been 
compared to the failure to ensure an impartial judge.141 Likewise, the 
appointment of an interested party’s attorney as prosecutor for contempt 
charges142 was analogized to the unlawful exclusion of members of the 
defendant’s race from a grand jury and an attorney representing multiple 
defendants with conflicting interests, which were in turn compared to a 
partial judge and the denial of the assistance of legal counsel, 
respectively.143 Thus, the case law has developed in this area so that if a 
judge or jury shows bias or other conflict, there must be automatic reversal 
regardless of the depth of the effect. Although this may seem like a fair 
treatment, the game of telephone comes at a cost. The consequences of 
these expanding precedents are having adverse impacts on defendants’ 
rights,144 and scholars and judges are continuing to have a difficult time 
determining where to draw the line between structural error and trial 
error.145 The practical implications are significant—defendant-appellants 
either get a new trial without further question, or they have to argue that 
the error was harmful. 
The post-Fulminante era is less like a game of telephone and more like 
reading Mad Libs™.146 The third original automatically reversible error 
listed in Chapman—wrongful admittance of a prior confession—was 
thrown out of the group in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s explanation of the 
                                                                                                                          
140 Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876 (1989) (“Among those basic fair trial rights that 
‘can never be treated as harmless’ is a defendant’s ‘right to an impartial adjudicator, be it judge or 
jury.’”) (quoting Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987)).  
141 See supra notes 134 & 140 and accompanying text (connecting the rationale from Gomez to 
Gray to Tumey).  
142 Young, 481 U.S. at 813.  
143 See supra notes 132, 135, & 138 and accompanying text (connecting the rationale from Young 
to Vasquez and then to Tumey ); supra notes 132 & 138 and accompanying text (connecting the 
rationale from Young to Holloway and then to Gideon). 
144 Infra Part VII.  
145 Supra Part II.  
146 Mad Libs™ is a game in which one player prompts other players for a list of words which are 
filled into a story that the group has not yet read. That player then reads the story, which is usually 
nonsensical and comedic, aloud to the rest of the group.  
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structural error and trial error dichotomy in Fulminante.147 Post-
Fulminante, courts have applied a spectrum of frameworks in addressing 
constitutional error below,148 even though the Court had set out to clarify 
the framework. In the confusion, the legal reasoning that connected cases 
read like a Mad Lib™—an inconsistent assortment of legal principles 
matched to a fact pattern. As was explained in Part IV.A, the same error 
was evaluated through four different frameworks, including only some of 
the factors from Fulminante, analogies to the trial error string-cite, and an 
unsupported conclusion that the types of structural error in Fulminante was 
exhaustive.149 
The Court has only expanded the types of structural errors in a few 
cases,150 and in attempting to clarify the Fulminante standard, the Court 
has only muddled the situation further. The reference in the Brecht case to 
errors falling on a spectrum is consistent with common sense but runs 
counter to the foundation of a bright-line rule.151 The reference to a 
spectrum of errors is also consistent with the expansion of automatically 
reversible errors through analogy in the post-Chapman era. But the 
expansion has decreased in the post-Fulminante era, and the Court has not 
taken a hard look at the framework since 2006.152 The initial confusion, 
too, has subsided somewhat. Because the classification of errors, or 
whether an error occurred at all, continue to be questions of great 
discretion for appellate courts, the current framework for appellate review 
of constitutional errors in a criminal case fails to uphold its own rationale. 
This rationale, and how to effectively evaluate the appellate framework, is 
laid out next.   
 VI.  MODE OF ANALYSIS: BASIC PRINCIPLES 
AND SECONDARY CONSIDERATIONS  
To effectively evaluate the current Fulminante framework, other 
scholarly approaches, and the proposal in this Note, a common metric must 
be established. This mode of analysis will consider the basic rationale 
behind the Court’s intention to create separate structural error and trial 
error categories as well as other policy concerns.   
                                                                                                                          
147 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991).   
148 Supra notes 100–05 and accompanying text.  
149 Supra notes 100–06 and accompanying text.  
150 See supra notes 116–23 and accompanying text (discussing the Sullivan and Gonzalez-Lopez).  
151 See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629 (1993) (“At the other end of the spectrum of 
constitutional errors lie structural defects . . . .”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).   
152 See Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218–19 (2006) (applying the current framework 
and discussing the original rationale behind it). 
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In the pre-Chapman era, any constitutional violation was grounds for 
reversal.153 But in Chapman, the Court expressed that the purpose of the 
harmless-error review was that it “block[s] setting aside convictions for 
small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed 
the result of the trial.”154 The Court recognized that harmless error “can 
work very unfair and mischievous results[,]” which is why the Court 
shifted the burden of persuasion to the state and the burden of proof is the 
highest in the United States legal system.155 From this framework, the 
Court hoped to create a more workable standard that “will save the good in 
harmless-error practices while avoiding the bad, so far as possible.”156 
The “good” and “bad” in harmless-error review were most clearly 
described in Fulminante, though the rationale is the same in both Chapman 
and Fulminante. The central purpose of a criminal trial, according to the 
Court, “is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or 
innocence, and promote[] public respect for the criminal process by 
focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually 
inevitable presence of immaterial error.”157 Thus, the “good” of harmless-
error review in the appellate process is its ability to uphold correctly-
decided convictions, even in the face of constitutional error, and to 
promote public respect through the fairness of the trial. Likewise, the 
“good” is to reverse convictions if they lack certain protections so that “a 
criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for 
determination of guilt or innocence.”158 The “bad” is the affirmation of 
wrongly-decided cases and an inability to reverse cases in which the trial 
was not a just mechanism for determining guilt or innocence. Therefore, 
the two basic principles of the Court’s analysis are that the central purpose 
of a trial is to (1) answer the factual question of a defendant’s guilt or 
innocence159 and (2) have process that is fundamentally fair.160   
Along with these two primary principles are what will be called 
secondary considerations. These policy considerations are also important 
to appellate review but do not necessarily carry as much weight as the 
                                                                                                                          
153 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22–24 (1967). As the Court might have argued in 1967, 
this change really happened in Fahy, id., but Chapman is generally cited for the proposition that 
harmless-error analysis applies to constitutional errors.  
154 Id. at 22. 
155 Id. at 24 (“It is for that reason that the original common-law harmless-error rule put the burden 
on the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his 
erroneously obtained judgment . . . [T]he Court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
156 Id. at 23. 
157 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308 (1991) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 
673, 681 (1986)). 
158 Id. at 310.  
159 This principle will be referred to as the “fact-finding principle.”  
160 This principle will be referred to as the “fundamental fairness principle.”  
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primary principles. Under this mode of analysis, the five secondary 
considerations used to evaluate the current and proposed frameworks 
include: (1) promoting judicial efficiency, (2) establishing finality in 
judicial action, (3) reducing sandbagging161 and gamesmanship, (4) 
promoting consistency, and (5) permitting flexibility in deserving cases. 
Promoting judicial efficiency is important to judicial review because 
an overburdened court system cannot take the appropriate time needed to 
evaluate each case on its merits.162 Likewise, finality of judicial decisions 
not only promotes judicial efficiency, but also promotes the public’s 
perception of the judicial system as a place where factual and legal 
questions are answered—not just recycled in numerous appeals and 
remands.163 Legal gamesmanship, and particularly sandbagging, are 
concerns that certainly should be considered, but their weight should not 
carry the day. A defendant or his attorney’s conscious decision to 
manipulate the system for his own benefit is a concern that should be 
recognized, but accusations of sandbagging are usually based solely on 
speculation and are, fortunately, uncommon.164  
Consistency has two forms: consistency in result and consistency in 
application. Consistency in result is merited by the desire to have similar 
cases result in similar conclusions regardless of the district in which they 
are brought. On a slightly different note, consistency in application is 
important because both lawyers and defendants need predictability and 
transparency in the appellate process. This is not to say that each similar 
case will result in a similar outcome, but rather that the analysis that 
determines the outcome is applied in the same manner in every case so that 
lawyers can be effective counselors and advocates for their clients. 
Flexibility runs counter to the idea of consistency. But flexibility is 
nonetheless necessary when a rigid application of a certain standard would 
result in an absurd conclusion.165  
Inherent in any evaluation that includes these factors is a give and take. 
For instance, an increase in the importance of the fact-finding principle 
may reduce the fundamental fairness and flexibility. Likewise, an increase 
                                                                                                                          
161 Sandbagging is the when a litigant “remain[s] silent about his objection and belatedly rais[es] 
the error only if the case does not conclude in his favor.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 
(2009) (internal citations omitted). 
162 See Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 197 (1996) (explaining that judicial efficiency is an 
important factor in the Court’s vacating and remanding powers).   
163 See id. (explaining that finality is an important factor in the Court’s vacating and remanding 
powers).  
164 See Thomas M. Hoskinson, Note, Criminal Procedure: Trial Integrity and the Defendant’s 
Rights Under the Plain Error Rule 52(b), 37 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1129, 1146–47 (2004) (explaining 
that sandbagging is not well-documented partly because the occurrences are so rare). 
165 See Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950) (“[The] . . . struggle 
of courts [is] sometimes to devise a formula that will encompass all situations and at other times to take 
hardship cases out from under the rigidity of previous declarations . . . .”).  
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in the fundamental fairness may result in a decrease in finality and judicial 
efficiency. The trick, of course, is to find a framework that promotes the 
primary principals and keeps the secondary considerations in check.  
 
A.  Application to the Fulminante Framework 
 
To both illustrate how this mode of analysis would work and evaluate 
the status quo, this mode of analysis will be applied to the Fulminante 
framework. Under Fulminante, certain errors will require automatic 
reversal.166 These structural errors are supposed to be those errors which 
would so undermine the trial as to classify it as an improper vehicle for 
justice.167 Also, trial errors that have a harmful impact on the verdict also 
get reversed under this framework.168 In this way the Fulminante 
framework focuses on the principle of fundamental fairness in appellate 
review.  
In regards to the fact-finding principle, harmless-error review, as 
decided in Chapman and applied to trial errors in Fulminante, focuses on 
the result of the trial by upholding decisions when the errors did not 
contribute to the verdict.169 However, the fact-finding principle is 
undermined by automatic reversal for structural errors that probably had no 
impact on the verdict whatsoever. This, of course, is the tradeoff for the 
fundamental fairness principle explained above.  
The greater issue with the Fulminante framework is with its 
inconsistency. As explained in Part IV, courts have struggled ever since the 
Fulminante decision to apply the framework.170 Not only do courts take a 
myriad of approaches to the application of the framework, but because 
there can be such dramatic results depending on the answer to this 
question—whether the error is structural or trial—the courts have been 
inconsistent with their case results.171 An appellant cannot even determine 
which test will be applied to his or her appeal in many situations.  
Consider, for example, erroneous jury instructions. The Supreme Court 
has held that inaccurate description of an element of a crime within jury 
instructions is a structural error requiring reversal.172 However, mildly 
confusing reasonable doubt instructions in a death penalty case were held 
to be subject to harmless-error analysis.173 So, in a capital case with mildly 
confusing jury instructions, the State received a much more deferential 
                                                                                                                          
166Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308–10 (1991). 
167 Id. at 310.  
168 Id. at 306–07. 
169 Id. at 307–08. 
170 Supra Part IV.A.  
171 Supra notes 100–05 and accompanying text.  
172 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993).  
173 United States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 33 (1st Cir. 2007).  
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standard of review than in a normal criminal sentencing with an inaccurate 
instruction. To be clear, both of these errors are substantial, but the 
difficulty in the Fulminante framework is that the chances of a successful 
appeal vary so greatly with the initial gatekeeping function of the courts, 
and that gatekeeping function produces inconsistent results.  
Moreover, the Fulminante framework lacks finality and judicial 
efficiency. Although trial error cases promote finality and judicial 
efficiency, the structural error classification undermines both by requiring 
reversal for some cases. Regardless of the effect on the verdict, any 
structural error during the trial or any harmful trial error must be reversed 
and remanded.174 
The structural error category binds the courts to an inflexible standard 
that requires reversal for the most minor structural errors.175 For example, 
even if a courtroom is unlawfully closed for a short amount of time, where 
the jury had no idea, no one tried to enter the courtroom, and the evidence 
of guilt was overwhelming, the court has no discretion in its decision and 
therefore, must reverse and remand for a new trial. Gamesmanship is 
another fault with the Fulminante framework. In a case with multiple 
constitutional errors that would cumulatively constitute structural error in 
some circuits, a lawyer could sit on her hands while she knows the errors 
are occurring, wait for a verdict, and if the verdict is not in her client’s 
favor, appeal and possibly have an automatic reversal in some circuits.176 
In the second trial, the prosecution may have a difficult time contacting the 
witnesses, examining the witnesses after so much time has elapsed, and 
otherwise putting on an equally compelling case. The result may be that a 
factually guilty defendant is acquitted in a second trial because of these 
burdens. This gamesmanship further undermines the fact-finding accuracy 
of the trial.  
VII. OTHER CRITIQUES AND SUGGESTIONS 
Only a handful of scholars directly address the specific difficulties 
with the current Fulminante framework. Research has returned only three 
attempts to create a new framework post-Fulminante and one pre-
Fulminante that is still worth discussion.177 A few major themes emerged 
                                                                                                                          
174 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308–10 (1991). 
175 Id.  
176 See supra notes 21–32 and accompanying text (explaining the current disagreement about 
forfeiture of structural error); supra note 125 and accompanying text (explaining that some circuits 
have defined cumulative constitutional errors as a structural error).  
177 Shepard, supra note 25; James Edward Wicht III, There Is No Such Thing as a Harmless 
Constitutional Error: Returning to a Rule of Automatic Reversal, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 73 (1997); 
McCord, supra note 25; Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 79 (1988).  
 1690 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1665 
from looking at other attempts to identify the issues in the structural error 
framework. Very few articles address the issue directly. Although many 
articles discuss the benefit or detriment of certain structural errors,178 only 
a handful address the overall framework itself. An article from 1988 found 
that a surprisingly small number of scholars addressed the post-Chapman 
confusion affecting courts,179 and this lack of scholarly discussion has not 
changed much since. Unsurprisingly, there is a dearth of articles that 
support the current framework as it stands.180 It is also apparent that in the 
few articles that address the framework head-on or propose a new analysis, 
the majority focus primarily on the fundamental fairness of the trial and 
overlook or undermine the fact-finding purpose.  
Professor David McCord wrote perhaps the most-cited article only five 
years after Fulminante. As was discussed supra,181 Professor McCord 
highlighted the utterly confusing application of the Fulminante standard in 
the lower courts.182 Other than the perplexing nature of the Fulminante 
decision, McCord also critiqued the difficulty that harmless-error has on 
keeping lower courts consistent.183 According to McCord, if an appellate 
court rules that an error was harmless, the lower courts do not learn from 
their mistakes.184 The Fulminante framework also forces courts to 
haphazardly divide rights into one category or another when, in reality, the 
rights at stake are more nuanced than that dichotomy allows.185  
Professor McCord’s solution is to use eight factors—instead of 
Fulminante’s three—to more accurately evaluate each right: (1) the 
importance of the right to the defendant, (2) the importance of the right to 
the public, (3) the degree of infringement, (4) the significance of the error-
causing actor to the criminal process, (5) if the error is attributable to the 
                                                                                                                          
178 See, e.g., William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Jury Selection Errors on Appeal, 38 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1391, 1391–92 (2001) (evaluating errors made in jury selection through the Fulminante 
framework); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying 
Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, 153–54 (1991) (addressing the issues 
from the Supreme Court’s approach to applying harmless-error review to coerced confessions); Kendra 
Oyer, Comment, Classifying Constructive Amendment as Trial or Structural Error, 158  U. PA. L. REV. 
609, 610–11 (2010) (evaluating constructive amendments in criminal cases as either a trial error or a 
structural error under Fulminante). Scholars have attempted to change the standard of harmless-error 
review under Chapman. See, e.g., Brent M. Craig, “What Were They Thinking?”—A Proposed 
Approach to Harmless Error Analysis, 8 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2006) (proposing a new 
approach to the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” approach from Chapman).  
179 Stacy & Dayton, supra note 177, at 81 n.11.   
180 This is probably due, in part, to a lack of interest in law review journals for articles that simply 
support the status quo.  
181 See supra notes 100–05 and accompanying text.  
182 McCord, supra note 25, at 1454. 
183 Id. at 1424 (“The erratic approaches taken by the lower courts were unsurprising given the 
conflicting messages sent by Fulminante.”). 
184 Id.  
185 Id. at 1454.  
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prosecution, the extent of willfulness of the infringement by the 
prosecution, (6) the degree to which the defendant is at fault, (7) the 
likelihood that the result would have been different absent the error, and 
(8) basic fairness.186 In applying this framework, the courts’ gatekeeping 
function to define structural error is abandoned entirely and each of these 
factors are considered to figure out whether it should be reversed.187  
This framework gives more flexibility to the courts while still focusing 
on fairness, limiting gamesmanship, and upholding the fact-finding 
purpose. But as McCord discusses, it also creates an inherent inconsistency 
between cases.188 Nonetheless, it frees appellate courts to evaluate each 
matter on a case-by-case basis on the actual issues that are important to the 
appellate process.189 Although the eight factors consider both the basic 
principles and secondary considerations in theory, there is little guidance 
on how things will balance when push comes to shove with these factors. 
The abandonment of the courts’ gatekeeping function initially seems to 
limit reversible error, but the factors weigh heavily on the principle of 
fundamental fairness, which would broaden reversible error in practice. 
For example, a right that is significant to the defendant, such as a public 
trial or right to counsel, would almost certainly also be important to the 
public as a sign of legitimacy. Likewise, the significance of the error-
causing actor to the criminal process would always favor the defendant and 
whether it be error from defendant’s counsel, prosecution, jury, or judge, it 
is simply a matter of degree of significance, though each plays an integral 
role in the trial. In fact, there is only one factor, the “likelihood that the 
result would have been different absent the error,”190 that directly addresses 
the fact-finding purpose of appellate review. The defendant-favored factors 
would likely increase reversals even if they were not automatic.   
Professors Tom Stacy and Kim Dayton were among the few authors 
who addressed post-Chapman confusion. Although their article does not 
address Fulminante directly as it had not yet been decided, their arguments 
are as applicable today as they were in 1988. According to Stacy and 
Dayton, the courts were too limited on automatic reversal and too focused 
on the fact-finding principle of appellate process.191 By focusing on the 
fact-finding principle, the rights of the defendant were being undermined 
and the appellate court was not keeping police, prosecutors, and lower 
courts in check through reversal.192 To address those issues, the authors 
                                                                                                                          
186 Id. at 1455–57.  
187 Id. at 1457–58.  
188 Id. at 1460.  
189 Id.  
190 Id. at 1457.  
191 Stacy & Dayton, supra note 177, at 88.  
192 Id. 
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proposed three questions: (1) “Whether the violation has impaired the 
purposes of the constitutional right in question;” (2) “Whether redoing the 
adjudicative process can effectively cure the harm caused by the 
violation;” and (3) “Whether a case requires reversal to deter future 
violations, even if it is unwarranted in this particular case.”193  
These three questions clarify what the lower courts should be looking 
for, much like the United States Supreme Court attempted to do with 
Fulminante. Further, this framework would greatly extend the fundamental 
fairness principle and undermine the fact-finding principle, by allowing 
cases that were justly decided to be reversed just as a deterrent for other 
trial courts. With that trade-off also comes a reduction in the finality and 
consistency of appeals, but it increases the flexibility of the appellate court. 
Therefore, although Professors Stacy and Dayton set out to greatly increase 
the power of a defendant’s constitutional protections, their framework’s 
departure from the fact-finding principle, finality, and consistency make it 
sway too far to the side of fundamental fairness.  
In 1997, Professor James Wicht went one step further to say that the 
courts should return to the pre-Chapman era and that all constitutional 
errors should be grounds for automatic reversal.194 Similar to Stacy and 
Dayton, Wicht believed that harmless error review completely overlooks 
the fundamental fairness inherent in protecting constitutional rights.195 By 
trying to establish a constitutional right as either structural or trial based, 
the inherent value in each right is ignored.196 Accordingly, the harmless-
error doctrine violates the principle of stare decisis because there was no 
“special justification” for departing from the pre-Chapman precedent.197 
Moreover, Professor Wicht argues that appellate courts are incapable of 
effectively weighing the value of constitutional errors.198  
The pros and cons of this proposal were addressed in great detail in 
Wicht’s article. As far as the courts were concerned, there would clearly be 
a massive blow to judicial efficiency and finality, but that would be offset 
by greater clarity and consistency if Wicht’s proposal was adopted.199 
Prosecutors would be burdened by the difficulties of putting on a second 
trial,200 which would certainly undermine the fact-finding principle, but 
                                                                                                                          
193 Id. at 91–92.  
194 Wicht, supra note 177, at 73.    
195 Id. at 85 (explaining that the pre-Chapman era better protected constitutional rights).  
196 Id. at 97.  
197 Id. at 86–87.  
198 Id. at 93.  
199 Id. at 100–01.  
200 Major difficulties to second trials are that witnesses’ testimonies may either be weakened over 
time or be entirely absent in the case of death or relocation and evidence can be lost or destroyed. 
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trials would be much fairer.201 Defendants would also be the beneficiaries 
of consistent, constitutionally proper results.202 The public would probably 
pay more in taxes to fund the increase of judicial activity, but it would 
benefit from the reliability, trust, and transparency of the system.203 
Beyond what Wicht discusses within his article, his proposal would greatly 
increase the opportunities for gamesmanship and put an extraordinary 
burden on the prosecution and judge to put on a constitutionally perfect 
trial for fear that, regardless of whether the verdict was clearly accurate, an 
appellate court will reverse.   
The final attempt to create a better framework was a made in an article 
by then-Yale Law student, Steven M. Shepard.204 Shepard evaluated an 
issue that is greatly overlooked by scholars and cuts strongly against 
structural error’s effectiveness in protecting defendant’s rights. Shepard’s 
main critique is that in some cases a judge must decide between factual 
guilt and fundamental fairness.205 Through the use of hypothetical 
scenarios, Shepard illustrates that in a case where factual guilt is clear, yet 
constitutional error occurred, judges are inclined to narrowly construe the 
scope of the constitutional error to keep it as a reversible trial error.206 For 
example, if a defendant’s guilt is clear from the record, but a biased judge 
presided over the trial, courts will tighten the definition of what it means to 
be “biased” in order to keep it from being classified as a structural error 
under Tumey and its progeny.207 In fact, Shepard points to the history of the 
definition of “biased judges” and “conflict-free counsel” as prime 
examples of how courts have set a higher bar for what it means to be 
biased or conflicted.208 To keep judges from continuing to undermine 
defendant’s rights, Shepard argues that most cases should go under a 
Chapman harmless-error review, and that only errors that the Court has 
determined to never contribute to the verdict should be labeled as structural 
error.209 In other words, if the error could ever contribute to the verdict, it 
should be evaluated under the harmless-error review. According to 
Shepard, structural error should be limited to violations of rights such as 
the right to a public trial, absence of discrimination in jury selection, and 
the right to defend one’s self.210  
                                                                                                                          
201 See Wicht, supra note 177, at 104–05 (arguing that this rule would increase the reliability of 
verdicts).  
202 Id. at 105.  
203 Id.  at 106–07.  
204 Shepard, supra note 25. 
205 Id. at 1185–86.  
206 Id. at 1186–89.  
207 Id. at 1190–96.  
208 Id. at 1186–1201. 
209 Id. at 1209–10.  
210 Id. at 1210.  
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More than any other scholar on the subject, Shepard promotes the fact-
finding principle of trials. But his critique of the Fulminante standard also 
allows his proposal to uphold the fundamental fairness in a unique way—
by diminishing the chances that a judge can narrowly define a defendant’s 
rights.211 His approach also promotes a more flexible and consistent 
application of the law. The most difficult part of his analysis, however, is 
how a court would be able to decide which errors will never contribute to 
the verdict and are thus structural errors. This would require the courts to 
consider every possible situation in which an error might occur. The 
theoretical and practical difficulty of thinking of each permutation of how 
an error can occur is an exercise in futility.  
Take, for example, the right to a public trial. Although somewhat far-
fetched, consider a situation in which the unlawful closure of the 
courtroom during voir dire excluded a defendant’s cousin from coming in 
to the proceedings. A jury member is then impaneled who, later in the 
proceeding, recognized the defendant’s cousin as a former adversary. By 
not recusing herself, the animus towards the cousin could later infect the 
jury member’s prejudice in reaching the verdict. Even if, theoretically, the 
jury members should not focus on anything in the gallery, it is impossible 
to say that a violation of the right to a public trial never contributes to the 
verdict, which creates a difficult standard in application.  
The suggestions from McCord, Stacy and Dayton, and Wicht all focus 
primarily on the fundamental fairness of the trial. This focus is possible 
only at the expense of the fact-finding principle as well as judicial 
efficiency, finality, gamesmanship, and consistency. Shepard’s article, 
however, addresses a different, yet equally important, aspect of 
fundamental fairness—the deterioration of a defendant’s rights. But 
Shepard puts it in a framework that still requires the courts to hypothesize 
over which errors will be structural, so that some errors can fall into the 
structural error classification.212 The suggested framework, set out below, 
attempts to go a step further than the other scholars in its focus on the fact-
finding principle of appellate review.  
VIII. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK: BURDEN SHIFTING AND THE 
ABOLISHMENT OF FULMINANTE 
Under the proposed framework, the Fulminante structural error and 
trial error dichotomy is abolished, as is any attempt to classify certain 
rights into a given category. The burden of persuasion is shifted in 
different scenarios to balance the fact-finding purpose and the fundamental 
                                                                                                                          
211 Id. at 1185–86. 
212 See id. at 1182 (requiring some errors to still fall in a category that would require automatic 
reversal). 
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fairness purpose. This framework also puts greater emphasis on reducing 
gamesmanship, promoting consistency in application, and permitting 
flexibility, but the framework may in practice reduce judicial efficiency 
and reduce the appearance of fundamental fairness. In order to state the 
framework coherently, it will be outlined in terms of a defendant appealing 
from a conviction.  
 Under this framework, appellate courts consider all error together; the 
court does not decide whether it was structural or trial error. The first 
question for the courts will be whether the error was properly preserved by 
a timely objection, forfeited by failure to raise a timely objection, or 
waived by a knowing and intelligent waiver. If the error was preserved, the 
court must then determine whether the error that occurred was a 
constitutional error or a non-constitutional error. All constitutional errors 
must undergo the harmless-error analysis under Chapman. But in 
compliance with a strict Chapman reading, the prosecution must persuade 
the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was 
harmless—that the error did not contribute to the verdict.213 With this 
burden shift comes a presumption that a constitutional error was harmful, 
which is necessary to safeguard the fundamental fairness of the trial. 
Further, in accordance with current precedent, the state must convince the 
court that the error in this specific case, not in some theoretical case or 
hypothetical scenario, did not contribute to the verdict.214 But if the 
preserved error was non-constitutional, the standard from Kotteakos still 
applies. Under Kotteakos, the court must conclude only that “the judgment 
was not substantially swayed by the error.”215 
Unpreserved error falls into one of two categories. If the forfeiture 
occurred and defense counsel had no reasonable opportunity to object, then 
the prosecution must prove that plain error did not occur in trial. If there 
was a reasonable opportunity to object, then the defense must prove that 
there was plain error. For purposes of this framework, a reasonable 
opportunity to object means that (1) defense counsel knew or should have 
known that an error was occurring or recently occurred, and (2) that during 
the period necessary to make a timely objection, counsel had an occasion 
to raise that objection. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
52(b), Puckett, Olano, and other United States Supreme Court cases, plain 
error is an error that is obvious, affects the defendant’s substantial rights, 
and “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
                                                                                                                          
213 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). 
214 See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (“The inquiry, in other words, is not 
whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but 
whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.”). 
215 Katteokos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946).  
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proceedings.”216 The other rules regarding specific errors that are not 
subject to plain-error review, such as subject matter jurisdiction, or errors 
that have certain timeliness restrictions remain the same.217  
If a new proceeding is warranted, the court should grant only the 
remedy that is required, not necessarily a new trial. In accordance with 
Waller, “[T]he remedy should be appropriate to the violation.”218 For 
instance, if reversible error occurred during a suppression hearing, only a 
new suppression hearing should be ordered, and a new trial is not needed if 
the second suppression hearing produces essentially the same result. Many 
errors, however, would still require a new trial. 
As for waiver, all rules and precedent regarding waiver remain the 
same: as long as the wavier was an “intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right,”219 neither plain-error nor harmless-error 
analysis would apply. Further, any other appellate review standard not 
mentioned above remains unchanged by this proposal.220 
 
A. Strengths and Weaknesses  
 
In applying the mode of analysis from Part VI to this proposed 
framework, it is clear that the major emphasis is on the fact-finding 
principle of appellate review. By applying harmless-error review to all 
preserved errors, verdicts will be upheld, regardless of the type of 
constitutional error, as long as there was little or no impact on the actual 
verdict. On review, the appellate court’s primary focus is whether the jury 
would have reached the verdict it did without the error. If the answer is 
yes, there is no need for a court to vacate and remand.  
This framework also promotes the principle of fundamental fairness in 
a similar way to Shepard’s framework. Since there is no gatekeeping 
function that defines structural error, there will be no erosion of a 
defendant’s rights by the narrow interpretation of what it means for a judge 
to be biased, for counsel to be conflicted, and a defendant’s other rights.  
As far as secondary considerations are concerned, this framework 
promotes judicial efficiency by allowing reversal only on preserved 
                                                                                                                          
216 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (internal quotations omitted); see also FED. 
R. EVID. 103 (“A party may claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error affects 
a substantial right of the party and . . . a party on the record: (a) timely objects or moves to strike; and 
(b) states the specific ground, unless it was apparent from the context . . . .”).  
217 See Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, supra note 6, at 933–41 (outlining precedent for 
when counsel has made a “timely” objection in certain circumstances and which types of error are not 
subject to plain-error even if they are not objected to (not including structural error)).  
218 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 50 (1984). 
219 Olano, 507 U.S. at 733 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 
220 See generally Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, supra note 6, at 905–1057 (outlining 
other appellate review standards, including standards for remand for evidentiary hearings, sentencing 
appeals, and habeas review). 
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harmful error or on forfeited error if the effected party can overcome the 
presumption of non-error. Unlike the current framework, or those proposed 
by McCord, Stacy and Dayton, and Wicht, errors will not require reversal 
as frequently merely because they fall into a particular class of errors. 
Instead, an appellate court will only require the burdensome second trial if 
an error was actually harmful or plain.  
This framework also enhances the consistency in application. By 
removing the gatekeeping function, courts will need to focus just on the 
specific fact pattern from the record. The confusion inherent in McCord’s 
eight factors or the structural error/trial error dichotomy is not present in 
this framework because the appellate courts do not need to classify errors 
in the first place. Finally, by shifting the burden to the defendant when 
confronted with forfeited errors, this framework virtually eliminates the 
opportunity for gamesmanship. If the defense counsel had a reasonable 
opportunity to object at trial but failed to, then the burden is on the defense 
to show that it was plain-error requiring reversal.  Thus, there is no longer 
the advantage to withholding an objection on a structural error. 
The most obvious shortcoming of this framework is that it could 
undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial. Some of the rights that are 
so important to the public’s perception of a “fair” criminal trial within the 
United States do not have a great impact, if any, on the verdict.221 By 
subjecting all errors to harmless-error review, there is the threat that no 
trial court will ever be reversed for violating certain rights. Some of these 
errors will be discussed in more depth infra. But take, for example, the 
closure of the courtroom. It is easy enough for the government to argue 
that the jury should not be affected by who is or is not present in the 
gallery. In fact, many trials occur with few, if any, observers present, and 
yet defendants do not claim that the trial is unfair. Even with the 
presumption of error, the government might overcome this presumption on 
review, and therefore continue to undermine the defendant’s rights. This 
would make parts of the Constitution into a paper dragon.  
The other major detriment of this framework is in the consistency of its 
results—that similar errors will result in similar outcomes. This framework 
increases the more nuanced look at error in a fact-specific review of the 
record.  If the same case, dealing with the unlawful closure of a courtroom 
during the examination of a key witness, were tried ten different times, and 
the error was on a spectrum from clearly harmless to clearly harmful, the 
exact line where a court is willing to reverse on harmless-error review may 
fluctuate between districts and circuits. This, of course, is inherent in 
harmless-error review, but because the application is broader in this 
framework, its detriments are as well.  
                                                                                                                          
221 See infra Part VIII.B. 
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The effects of these two detriments are weakened, however, by a few 
considerations. When applied correctly, the Chapman harmless-error test 
presumes harm.222 Unless the prosecution can prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the error was harmless in this particular case, the verdict will 
be reversed.223 Thus, inherent in the harmless-error analysis is a 
presumption of harm that protects the fundamental fairness of the trial. 
Furthermore, the focus on what exactly it means to be a “fundamentally 
fair” trial is also shifted. Fundamental fairness can mean both the 
appearance of fairness and actual fairness. Fundamental rights, like the 
right to a public trial or a trial by jury, are based primarily in a feeling that 
secret tribunals and bench trials are unfair vehicles for administering 
criminal justice.224 Historically, there is some truth to the American distaste 
for the English legal system at the time the Constitution was written.225 But 
actual fairness is based on the idea that guilty people are correctly 
convicted and innocent people are correctly acquitted. This idea of actual 
fairness parallels the fact-finding principle. When push comes to shove in 
criminal trials, the actual fairness of the case, and not the perceived 
fairness, should take precedent.  
 
B.  Application of Framework  
  
To show how this proposed framework would change current 
structural-error analysis, the framework will be applied to three cases that 
are currently classified as structural error. The three errors used are (1) the 
right to a public trial, (2) deficient reasonable doubt instructions, and (3) 
erroneous deprivation of a defendant’s choice of counsel.  
Although the right to a public trial, classified as a structural error after 
Waller, requires automatic reversal under the Fulminante framework,226 
under this proposed framework reversal may not actually be a foregone 
                                                                                                                          
222 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can 
be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”). 
223 Id.  
224 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268–70 (1948) (“The traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret 
trials has been variously ascribed to the notorious use of this practice by the Spanish Inquisition, to the 
excesses of the English Court of Star Chamber, and to the French monarchy's abuse of the lettre de 
cachet. All of these institutions obviously symbolized a menace to liberty. In the hands of despotic 
groups each of them had become an instrument for the suppression of political and religious heresies in 
ruthless disregard of the right of an accused to a fair trial. Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an 
accused that his trial be conducted in public may confer upon our society, the guarantee has always 
been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of 
persecution.”). 
225 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the 
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 483–84 (1986) (describing that the appearance of 
fairness is fundamental to an analysis on due process).  
226 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49–50 (1984). 
 2016] A NEW LOOK AT CONSTITUTIONAL ERRORS IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL 1699 
 
conclusion. Even with the presumption of harmfulness, a prosecutor-
appellee could argue that, absent evidence to the contrary, the closure had 
no impact on the jury. For instance, in the Waller case, the jury was not 
even present during the suppression hearing because the courtroom had 
been closed to try and protect the privacy of people other than the 
defendant.227 On appeal, the Court summarily dismissed the Plaintiff’s 
Fourth Amendment arguments about the result of the suppression hearings 
and only evaluated the claims regarding the unlawful closure of the trial 
court during a suppression hearing.228 In the remand order, the Court only 
ordered a new suppression hearing, not a new trial, as long as the trial court 
found in the new hearing that essentially same evidence was suppressed.229  
Under this framework, the appellee could have brought a fact-specific 
argument as to why the same evidence would or would not have been 
suppressed regardless of the courtroom being closed. Not only would the 
judge’s legal analysis have likely been dissuaded by the presence or 
absence of the public, but the jury was not even present to have witnessed 
any of the argument or the presence or absence of the public. Unlike a 
normal appellate review for a motion to suppress, the government would 
need to show that the trial court’s decision was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, which is a more defendant-favored standard of review 
than the normal de novo review of law and clearly erroneous review of 
fact230 on a defendant’s appeal of a motion to suppress. Even still, the 
prosecutor-appellee’s argument would likely overcome its burden of 
persuasion and therefore, no new trial would be needed in a case where the 
evidence was clearly admissible or inadmissible. This is a prime example 
of how this framework supports the fact-finding principle, finality, and 
judicial efficiency. There is still enough flexibility that, in certain cases, if 
the closure is harmful and the prosecution cannot overcome its burden, a 
new trial or motion is warranted.  
Under the Fulminante framework, it is unclear when errors in 
reasonable doubt instructions are structural errors or trial errors.231 The 
specific deficiency would need to be analyzed in each case and the 
prosecutor would have to show that the deficiency was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Where courts would draw the line on harmlessness may 
vary between circuits, but under this framework, the application is at least 
consistent and efficient.  
                                                                                                                          
227 Id. at 41–42.  
228 See id. at 43 & 43 n.3 (“These cases present three questions: First, does the accused's Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial extend to a suppression hearing conducted prior to the presentation of 
evidence to the jury? Second, if so, was that right violated here? Third, if so, what is the appropriate 
remedy?”). 
229 Id. at 50.  
230 United States v. Dupree, 323 F.3d 480, 484 (6th Cir. 2003).  
231 Supra notes 172–75 and accompanying text. 
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Of course, there is a strong argument that any decision by the court 
that a deficient reasonable doubt instruction was harmless usurps the role 
of the jury and infringes on the right to a jury trial.232 However, the United 
States Supreme Court held that “an instruction that omits an element of the 
offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or 
an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.”233 Although 
reasonable doubt instructions change the burden for each element of an 
offense, the omission of an element likewise places the appellate court in 
the shoes of the jury. The same logic follows, however, that this sort of 
error does not necessarily render the criminal trial unfair or unreliable. 
With harmless-error, the defendant will still get a new trial unless the 
prosecution can overcome the presumption of harmfulness, but the appeals 
process does not have to pass the initial gate-keeping question in 
Fulminante which leads to erratic results.  
Deficient reasonable doubt instructions also show how applying 
harmless-error review protects the fundamental fairness. As Shepard 
explains in his note, under the current Fulminante framework, once an 
appellate court determines that reasonable doubt instructions are deficient, 
a new trial is automatic.234 This forces the courts to undermine the 
definition of “deficient” in order to affirm a conviction in a case of 
borderline deficiency and overwhelming guilt. Under harmless-error 
review, a court can decide that jury instructions were constitutionally 
deficient, thereby setting precedent for lower courts and protecting the 
defendant’s rights, but the court can also decide that the instructions were 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby promoting judicial efficiency 
and finality.  
The erroneous deprivation of the defendant’s right to choose his 
counsel stresses the boundaries of this framework. Inherent in someone’s 
choice of counsel are the advocacy skills that the lawyer brings to trial. The 
chosen lawyer influences, both obviously and subtly, the jury’s decision of 
the case because of his or her conduct, strategy, and demeanor. As with 
many errors, it is also extraordinarily difficult to prove a non-occurrence—
to prove that the lawyer who would have represented the defendant would 
have made a difference. But this is where a strict application of harmless-
error is necessary, and under this framework the burden is on the 
prosecution to prove this non-occurrence. With all the nuances that are 
inherent in the art of trial advocacy, it would be difficult to imagine a 
scenario in which the prosecution would meet this burden. This is 
different, however, then saying that the prosecution could never meet its 
burden of proving that a non-occurrence was harmless beyond a reasonable 
                                                                                                                          
232 Supra note 118 and accompanying text.  
233 Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999) (emphasis in original). 
234 See supra note 205–13 and accompanying text.  
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doubt. That would put this right, and possibly others, into a category 
which, however you name it, presents the same problems as the current 
framework.  
In a case like this, the appellate court should always analyze the fact-
specific argument and refrain from broadly analogizing it to other cases 
that are frequently reversed. It is this type of error which best show the 
weaknesses in this proposed framework: there are some errors that would 
be inherently onerous for the prosecution to meet its burden. This 
realization follows closely with how automatic-reversal started in the first 
place.  Footnote eight of Chapman included a mere list of errors that the 
Court thought would be impossible to prove harmlessness at the time.235 
But that logic was greatly undermined when Payne was unclassified as an 
automatically reversible error in the Fulminante case.236 In other words, 
just because it may be difficult or impossible to think of a situation in 
which a certain error can be found harmless does not necessarily mean that 
it should be evaluated under a different standard. This proposed framework 
does not force these errors to be haphazardly categorized into one type or 
the other. Instead, the application of the proposed framework would be the 
same in every case, and in this balance between fact-finding and 
fundamental fairness, obtain more consistent and fair results. 
Overall, there could be a concern that the application of this framework 
would give trial judges too much flexibility with a defendant’s rights. If 
constitutional errors were frequently found harmless, what would stop a 
judge from consistently closing the courtroom or appointing conflicted 
defense counsel? Although this is a considerable danger in theory, it is 
greatly undermined by the fact that since 1967 there have been 
constitutional errors subject to harmless-error review and there is no call to 
arms over widespread judicial abuse. For example, the string-cite of trial 
errors from Fulminante includes errors such as the violation of the 
Confrontation Clause when a defendant was not permitted to cross-
examine a witness for bias.237 Although there is a lot of debate over the 
protections and limitations of the Confrontation Clause, there is little to no 
discussion that judges are undermining the Confrontation Clause solely 
because it is subject to harmless-error review. The long history of 
harmless-error review, as applied to constitutional errors since Chapman, 
negates any worry that harmless-error application would result in judicial 
abuse of constitutional rights. 
 
                                                                                                                          
235 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967). 
236 See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text.  
237 Fulminante v. Arizona, 499 U.S. 279, 307 (1991) (referring to Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 
U.S. 673, 684 (1986)).  
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IX. CONCLUSION 
In the twenty-five years since the Court created a distinction between 
trial errors and structural errors, discussion of the framework as a whole 
has been noticeably absent.238 Yet confusion and misapplication of the 
Fulminante framework has been pervasive. Of greater concern is the 
tendency for courts to use their discretion to limit the strength of a 
defendant’s constitutional protection, by limiting the protective reach of 
classifications like biased judges or conflicted counsel in order to uphold a 
seemingly correct jury verdict. The Court may have a chance to revisit the 
structural error and trial error dichotomy at some point in the near future. 
In order to keep the discussion alive, the proposed framework focuses on 
the principle of fact-finding in appellate review, unlike other suggestions 
that focus primarily on fundamental fairness. By subjecting all properly 
preserved constitutional errors to harmless-error review, and requiring 
burden shifting for forfeited errors under plain-error review, the courts 
would have a more workable framework that balances fundamental 
fairness, promotes accurate fact-finding, increases judicial efficiency, 
increases consistency in application, and protects against gamesmanship. 
This proposal strikes better balance for promoting the Supreme Court’s 
rationale that the “central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual 
question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and promote[] public respect 
for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the 
trial.”239 
                                                                                                                          
238 See supra notes 179–83 and accompanying text.  
239 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308 (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681). 
